University of South Florida

Digital Commons @ University of South Florida
Education Policy Analysis Archives (EPAA)

USF Faculty Collections

November 2001

Educational policy analysis archives
Arizona State University
University of South Florida

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/usf_EPAA

Recommended Citation
Arizona State University and University of South Florida, "Educational policy analysis archives" (2001).
Education Policy Analysis Archives (EPAA). 99.
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/usf_EPAA/99

This Text is brought to you for free and open access by the USF Faculty Collections at Digital Commons @
University of South Florida. It has been accepted for inclusion in Education Policy Analysis Archives (EPAA) by an
authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Education Policy Analysis Archives
Volume 9 Number 50

November 30, 2001

ISSN 1068-2341

A peer-reviewed scholarly journal
Editor: Gene V Glass
College of Education
Arizona State University
Copyright 2001, the EDUCATION POLICY ANALYSIS ARCHIVES .
Permission is hereby granted to copy any article
if EPAA is credited and copies are not sold.
Articles appearing in EPAA are abstracted in the Current
Index to Journals in Education by the ERIC Clearinghouse on
Assessment and Evaluation and are permanently archived in
Resources in Education.

School Choice Policies in the Political Spectacle1
Linda Miller-Kahn
Boulder, Colorado
Mary Lee Smith
Arizona State University
Citation: Miller-Kahn, L. & Smith, M.L. (2001, November 30). School choice policies in the
political spectacle, Education Policy Analysis Archives, 9(50). Retrieved [date] from
http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v9n50.html.

Abstract
This article presents research on school choice. It takes the case of a
school district in Boulder, Colorado, through the decade of the 1990s and
shows how interest groups took advantage of federal, state, and district
policies meant to promote school choice and molded them into a system
of schools that met individualistic interests rather than the common
good. Extensive interviewing and analysis of documents and media
reports served as sources of evidence. The authors argue that district
officials accommodated the demands of elite groups of parents to
transform the district. The study is framed by revisionist theories of
policy, particularly Murray Edelman's theory of political spectacle
wherein real values are allocated to a few groups, the allocation
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occurring largely out of public scrutiny. For most of the public, however,
policies are largely symbolic.
When George W. Bush took office in 2001, he proposed legislation that would
require all students in grades three through twelve to take a national test. A student's
scores would determine whether he or she could pass to the next grade or stay in the
same grade for another year. Scores would also determine whether high school students
could graduate. Moreover, the average test score of a school's students would be used to
determine whether the school itself was improving. Schools that failed to improve would
be held accountable to "market forces." Parents of children in failing schools would be
given a sum of money ($1500 is the amount usually mentioned) to spend on tuition at
schools of their choice, whether public or private, sectarian or not, other than the
neighborhood school that their children would normally attend. In theory this plan would
be good for everyone, because parents could opt out of schools that were failing and go
to the schools of their choice. Faced with the threat that families might leave,
administrators of neighborhood schools would have to take steps to improve. Those that
did not respond to these market forces would eventually find the school doors closed
permanently, the parents exiting with their $1500 to spend elsewhere.
To Bush advisors, it was important that the press refer to this policy as "school
choice." To his critics, it was important to call it "school vouchers." Language matters.
Choice sounds like a good thing. Choice sounds American. If we can choose a Hoover
upright canister from the array of vacuum cleaners on the market, why shouldn't we be
able to choose the schools that satisfy our individual preferences and needs?2
As a policy, school choice has a history, a theory, a community of belief, research,
and politics. Milton Friedman, noted economist and advocate for the free market and its
application to all aspects of political and social life, introduced the concept of choice as
a remedy for underachieving schools. He reasoned that public schools were ineffective
because they belonged to the State. As creatures of government they became
bureaucratic, entrenched, and unresponsive to parents. Overall, they were inefficient,
especially compared to private and parochial schools, producing less achievement for
greater cost. Like the U.S. economy of the 1970's public education under performed and
underachieved. Conditions were bad enough, he argued, that fundamental reform was
only possible by injecting the discipline of market forces. Freed of obligation to send
their children to neighborhood schools, parents would educate themselves about options
and then select the ones that would best meet the needs of their own children. Public
schools, forced to compete, would improve and diversify their programs. Parents with
options would be more likely to participate in the education of their children. The key
policy issue, however, was to divert public funds for private use. A pupil's state
allocation should be given to parents to use as they saw fit. The invisible hand would
move across the landscape of education and improve it for everyone. So thought
Friedman, who created a large following among neo-liberals. Along with Friedrich
Hayek, Friedman's work made a significant impact on Margaret Thatcher, British Prime
Minister, and spread to many parts of the world. A Nation at Risk, the report released by
the Reagan administration (National Commission on Education, 1983), mentioned
market choices as a response to the crisis in public schools.
School choice (as we will call it here) gained adherents in several categories (e.g.,
Apple, 2001). Together, these groups bought choice policies space in the national
discourse about schools:
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Political conservatives viewed choice policies in light of their general distrust of
and antipathy toward all government institutions. Since they believed that the size
and power of government should be constrained, they also slanted their discourse,
calling public schools "government schools," monopoly schools, or even "socialist
schools." They likened the privatizing of education to the fall of the Berlin Wall
and the collapse of the soviet states.
Religious conservatives viewed school choice policies as ways of escaping the
wickedness—sex education, secular humanism, assault on family rights and
values, absence of school prayer, and promotion of homosexual and other
nontraditional life styles, even satanism—that to them was evident in public
schools.
Cultural restorationists (or neoconservatives) such as E.D. Hirsch (whose Core
Knowledge curriculum package played a role in the Boulder case), William
Bennett (speaking on behalf of the Reagan and Bush administrations) and others
viewed choice policies as a way out of the quagmire they believed progressive
"educationists" and "educrats" had made of public schools. Advocates of home
schooling and traditional pedagogy made common cause with them.
Existing parochial schools, in light of declining enrollments, identified choice
policy as a way for their institutions to survive.
Activist parents in some predominantly non-white urban neighborhoods, having
lost faith in the schools their children attended, identified choice as a way to
escape those schools. Groups such as the Black Alliance for Educational Options
in Milwaukee often received funding from foundations such as the Friedman and
Walton Foundations to press their case. 3
Entrepreneurs and corporations that desire to construct private schools for profit
as well as those that want to market products and services to public, choice, and
private schools alike.
Although the aims of these groups sometimes diverged, they forged an effective
coalition to provide political support, funding, and discourse in favor of various policy
instruments under the school choice umbrella. A number of conservative think tanks
provided strong communication networks for these groups to pool their ideas and
resources. The same networks funded research, which resulted in studies that seemed to
provide an intellectual justification for choice.
The choice coalition favored vouchers as the most effective instrument of school
choice and the closest to the free-market ideal. However, it also pushed for several
"second best" alternative policy instruments including charter schools, magnet schools
within districts, tuition tax credits, inter-district and intra-district transfer policies, as
well as incentives for education corporations that arose from the private sector. As states
turned down legislation and referenda on voucher programs, advocates pursued these
other alternatives. Even outside the choice coalition, some people who believed that
vouchers would undermine public schools also advocated charters as a way to avoid
them.
But is school choice, particularly embodied by charter schools, a rational means to
save public schools? Will charters make the school system more effective? Or will
charter schools simply open the way to more extreme forms of privatizing them? Is there
any way of knowing whether any such contradictory claims could be answered at all?
In this article, we present a case of school choice policy. We consider policies in
general through the theory of political spectacle, which contrasts radically from

3 of 41

conventional notions about policy and politics. Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram's
(1997, pp. 3-4) definition of politics fits our sense of deep contradictions:
The term "politics" is associated in the popular vernacular with the strategic
manipulation of power to serve personal or narrow special interests at the
expense of more legitimate concerns. This construction has eclipsed the
classic understanding of politics as the means through which collectivities
make decisions to serve the general (public) interests of the entire society.
Most people and many scholars define policy as the authoritative and rational
allocation of values. That is, policies arise as sensible responses to public needs. A
consensus about the common public good develops out of citizen and political debate;
administrative authorities develop regulations, instruments, and programs that are likely
to meet those needs. These means are enacted and the public learns about the
relationship of means to ends—how well the instruments and programs meet the needs
and goals of the policy. The conventional view conceives of the policy process as
relatively linear and straightforward. Politics, the struggle for relative power among
constituent groups, is in the background. Deborah Stone called this "the rationality
project." To counter the conventional, rational view of policy, Stone argues that a
conception of policy with politics in the foreground provides a better fit with the
experience of history. As an alternative to the rationality project she offers the study of
policy within the "polis," or political community. The model for studying policy should
"account for the possibilities of changing one's objectives, of pursuing contradictory
objectives simultaneously, of winning by appearing to lose and turning loss into an
appearance of victory, and ... of attaining objectives by portraying oneself as having
attained them" (Stone, 1997, p. 9).
She goes on to argue that the production model in the rationality project "fails to
capture what I see as the essence of policy making in political communities: the struggle
over ideas. Ideas are a medium of exchange and a mode of influence even more
powerful than money and votes and guns" (Stone, 1997, p. 11).
The case we present here can be understood as a case of political spectacle.
Political spectacle theory holds that contemporary politics resembles theater, with
directors, stages, casts of actors, narrative plots, and (most importantly) a curtain that
separates the action onstage—what the audience has access to—from the
backstage—where the real "allocation of values" takes place.
Murray Edelman describes it thus:
[There] is a distinction between politics as a spectator sport and political
activity as utilized by organized groups to get quite tangible benefits for
themselves. For most men most of the time politics is a series of pictures in
the mind, placed there by television news, magazines, and discussions. The
pictures create a moving panorama taking place in a world the public never
quite touches (Edelman 1985, p. 5).
Edelman identifies seven elements of the theory: symbolic language; casting
political actors as leaders, allies, and enemies; dramaturgy (staging, plotting and
costuming); the illusion of rationality; the illusion of democratic participation,
disconnection between means and ends; distinguishing action on stage versus action
backstage.
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Symbolic Language
Language is at the heart of political spectacle, and language is always ambiguous.
In political campaigns, the use of such words as patriotism, democracy, and compassion
is metaphorical. So is the use of such words as "accountability," "high standards,"
"freedom of choice", and the like in conversations about school policy. Concrete
referents to these abstract words are lacking, so that no tether exists to tie them to the
world of experience and intractable, concrete details. Or rather, there are so many
different mental pictures that form in the minds of the public when these words are
spoken that one can scarcely pin down the specific meaning of the person who spoke
them. According to Edelman, "[D]ictionary meanings are operationally close to
irrelevant" when words are used for political purposes" (Edelman 1985, p. 139) .
Such linguistic ambiguity creates a kind of fog. It holds the public in a thrall.
Politicians use ambiguous language to unite a public and create an impression of
consensus that does not exist. For example, "accountability" suggests something quite
different to accountants, to educators, and to testing experts. When teachers hear the
word, they might be imagining professional and moral responsibility for the welfare of
their students. In the corporate world, people might imagine something different, a
mechanism for tightening controls over teachers' actions.
Ambiguous, multivalent meanings create anxiety in the public when politicians use
words to evoke crisis. The paradigm case of using lurid language in educational policy is
The Nation At Risk. Its author claimed that the decline in educational achievement was
so drastic that had a foreign power done to our country what our schools have done it
would be considered an act of war:
[T]he educational foundations of our society are presently being eroded by a
rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a Nation and a
people. (National Commission on Education, 1983, p. 1)
This use of graphic, metaphorical language made a connection in people's minds
between academic achievement and national defense and between achievement and
economic competitiveness. Such language evokes images of a depleted, diseased, and
failed public school system, and one that endangers U.S. economic health and even its
security. These images have been engrained in the background assumptions the public
hold, evidence to the contrary notwithstanding. The metaphors used in political spectacle
have long since lost any concrete referents they might have had. Whether or not the
crisis in A Nation at Risk and subsequent reports is realistic, it serves the political
spectacle in two ways. First, it serves as a pretext for radical actions offered by policy
makers to correct the alleged problem, and secondly, it arouses emotional rather than
critical responses in the public.
Political language is banal (the public has heard the words so often) and ritualistic.
Political language is strategic (officials use it to advance a political goal). Political
language generates emotional responses rather than critical responses or concrete
actions. Political language bemuses, obfuscates, befogs, mystifies, lulls, glosses.
Casting Political Actors as Leaders, Enemies and Allies and Plotting Their Actions.
In the second element of political spectacle, characters are cast to play certain roles.
The constituent groups construct and then take on roles such as leader, ally and enemy.
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The public generally believes that such roles are natural and inevitable and fails to
recognize them as social constructions. The public believes that leadership is a trait that
people have more or less of, based on their genetic endowment or early upbringing. This
is the cult of personality.
A belief that better fits political spectacle theory is that leadership is a role that
certain individuals take on and shape themselves to fit. Politicians in the policy arena
take advantage of the common ideology that some people are born leaders and thus are
different from the rest of us, according to Edelman. Persons who would be seen as
leaders reinforce images of themselves as leaders by acting in formal, public settings, as
leaders are supposed to act, that is "through a dramaturgical performance emphasizing
the traits popularly associated with leadership: forcefulness, responsibility, courage,
decency, and so on" (Edelman 1985, p. 81).
The defining of policy actors as leaders functions to insure quiescence and justify
unequal privileges and authority. In the political spectacle leaders identify crises and
must launch programs that can produce dramatic outcomes in a short period of time. The
public seldom has the chance to judge a program by its long-range benefits and burdens.
Because the leader accentuates the dramatic response, the success or failure of the acts
of the leader can seldom be traced. Often, the leaders are long-gone before the effects
become clear, if they ever do.
Likewise, leaders create enemies and stage battles for dramaturgical effects. Media
reinforce the aspects of spectacle rather than substance. According to Edelman,
"Because politics involves conflict about material advantages, status, and moral issues,
some people are always pitted against others and see them as adversaries or as enemies...
They help give the political spectacle its power to arouse passions, fears, and hopes..."
Leaders have much to gain by exaggerating the threat the enemy poses and by distorting
the facts of the enemy's record. The leader has much to gain by discounting the
arguments of enemies and portraying them as irrational and ideological (while the leader
is rational and fair-minded)" (Edelman 1988, p. 66, p. 73).
Stone states that "Symbolic devices are especially persuasive and emotionally
compelling because their story line is hidden and their sheer poetry is often
stunning.....The most important feature of all symbols, both in art and politics, is their
ambiguity [because a] symbol can mean two (or more) things simultaneously....
Ambiguity enables the transformation of individual intentions and actions into collective
results and purposes.... [A]mbiguity allows leaders to aggregate support from different
quarters for a single policy.... [A]mbiguity allows leaders of interest groups and political
movements to bring together people with wishes for different policies.... (Stone, 1997,
pp. 152-158).
Dramaturgy: Political Stages, Props, and Costumes
According to Edelman, political acts take place in contexts that suggest that a few
individuals are actors and most are spectators. These formal settings reinforce and justify
the social distance between the two groups and legitimize " a series of future acts (whose
content is still unknown) and thereby maximizing the chance of acquiescence"
(Edelman, 1985, p. 98). Policies announced from in front of the presidential seal, rules
handed down from a Federal Court bench or from other formal or evocative settings
have this function. 4
Democratic Participation as Illusion5
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The conventional model of the policy process conceives that the public, once
informed of the objective facts about the details of a policy, will be in better position to
participate in the policy process. They can deliberate in a more informed way. But
Edelman argues that " the public is constantly reminded that its role is minor, largely
passive, and at most reactive. The intense publicity given to voting and elections is itself
a potent signal of the essential powerlessness of political spectators.... an individual vote
is more nearly a form of self-expression and of legitimation than of influence and that
the link between elections and value allocations is tenuous" (Edelman, 1988, p. 97).
In the political spectacle, leaders act. Others react. Most people believe they
participate in democracy by voting or at most by testifying at hearings where policies are
under consideration. According to Edelman, however, in politicized policy making the
actions of the public amount to mere rituals—highly formalized and far removed from
where the real decisions are made. The broad visions and fine details of policies are
worked out backstage.
Realizing that participation is a formality creates a self-fulfilling prophecy. If a
person believes she lacks control over government and policy making, she then takes
less active interest in it and rarely takes action in relation to it. Passivity and cynical or
resigned detachment exacerbate political spectacle.
The widespread use of opinion polls has largely displaced authentic participation in
policy decisions and the allocation of educational values. Indeed, political actors look to
the results of polls to formulate a set of symbolic gestures. For example, politicians often
point to the results of polls that show the majority of the public favors "ending social
promotion." The findings of polls thus provide a justification for such policies.
Politicians also use polling results to indicate what kinds of symbols best promote
themselves. They then adopt hair styles, hand gestures, and slogans that the polls show
would be popular.6 Susan Herbst (1993, p. 50), in her book Numbered Voices,
emphasized the hypocritical use of polling results: "Machiavelli believed that if a rule
was to gain control over the populace, he must seem humane to the masses regardless of
his true feelings for them…. Superficial appearances matter most of all." 7
Polls distance the public from authentic political action. Over time, as the extent of
polling increased, public cynicism toward government has also increased, along with
general political alienation. "[R]esponding to polls is a reactive form of political
expression…. Because of its routinized procedures [polling] does not demand the same
level of emotional (and physical) intensity as does [sic] striking, demonstrating,
door-to-door canvassing or attending meetings." (Herbst, 1993, p. 153) 8
Since the questioning takes place privately and anonymously, a person can answer
without fear of being held accountable for consistency over time or among issues. The
respondent may speak without having any information or thoughtful reflection and
conversation about the topic. Since polling takes place privately, citizens lack the chance
to discuss issues with others, thereby having the chance to learn more about the issues
and perhaps modify them. Private polling tends to atomize the pubic, isolating them
from one another and therefore disempowering them. It tends to diminish the kinds of
grass roots collective action that requires social interaction among people.
Illusion of Rationality
In the rationality project, policy analysts would like to think that their concepts are
above politics, but this is not possible. Instead, policy analysis is "itself a creature of
politics; it is strategically crafted argument, designed to create ambiguities and
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paradoxes and to resolve them in a particular direction" (Stone, 1997, p.7). Edelman
adds, "any political analysis that encourages belief in a secure, rational, and cooperative
world fails the test of conformity to experience and to the record of history" (Edelman,
1988, p. 4).
According to Edelman, "complete rationality in decision-making is never possible...
because knowledge of consequences of any course of action is always fragmentary,
because future values cannot be anticipated perfectly, and because only a few of the
possible alternative courses of action ever come to mind" (Edelman, 1988, p. 68). In
political acts, actors evoke symbols of rationality. They point to the results of public
polls, census statistics, or declining test scores to justify actions they want to take on
political grounds. 9
Although rationality is an illusion, the public must believe in the rational and
ethical underpinning of the action or else it will fail the test of credibility and authority.
Thus do policy researchers become political actors or pawns of politicians by producing
studies and statistics that appear objective and rational.
In the rationality project, people are believed to be rational actors who make
reasoned choices. But Stone points out that in the political world, actions come about for
emotional reasons. Social reasons may govern who cooperates with and who fights with
whom. Building coalitions, taking sides, and negotiating deals replace or stand equal to
reason in explaining actions in the political spectacle.
Disconnection of Means and Ends
One can distinguish instrumental from symbolic policies by judging whether their
goals have credible relationship to the means provided or suggested to achieve them. Is
there a technology or research base that connects programs to desired outcomes? Are
teachers equipped to deliver the programs? Have enough time and material resources
been provided to develop and implement them? Is there any provision for monitoring
implementation or assessing effects? If not, one suspects a primarily symbolic policy.
Symbolic policies reinforce the leadership image of those that proposed them and instill
quiescence among others—a dulling of critical response. Calling for a reduction in class
size positions the political actor as a friend of education and defender of high
achievement standards. The public is lulled into acquiescence: something seems to be
done to address the problem that worried them. People in such a state are unlikely to ask
about the potential side effects on teacher supply and classroom availability (or what
children are most likely to be taught by uncertified teachers as a result) (e.g., Fetler,
1994). The high costs of the program may make implementation prohibitive. The leader
symbolically benefits while material benefits for children will be unequally distributed
and largely out of sight—or entirely absent.
Even the notion of means and ends assumes rationality in politics that is seldom
present. Problems and courses of action (policy goals and policy instruments) are
themselves social constructions. That is, some political actors view poverty as a problem
to be solved, others as an inevitable part of the natural order and thus beyond the means
of policy to remedy.
According to Edelman, "The language that constructs a problem and provides an
origin for it is also a rationale for vesting authority in people who claim some kind of
competence. Willingness to suspend one's own critical judgment in favor of someone
regarded as able to cope creates authority.... People with credentials accordingly have a
vested interest in specific problems and in specific origins for them" (Edelman, 1988,
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pp. 20-21). "A 'policy' then, is a set of shifting, diverse, and contradictory responses to a
spectrum of political interests" (Edelman, 1988, p. 25).
But symbolic policies still have effects, though they are not necessarily related to
the problem they were set to solve.
The construction of problems sometimes carries with it a more far reaching
perverse effects: it helps perpetuate or intensify the conditions that are
defined as the problem, an outcome that typically stems from efforts to cope
with a condition by changing the consciousness or the behavior of
individuals while preserving the institutions that generate consciousness and
behavior.... Imprisonment may help perpetuate crime by exposing prisoners
to knowledgeable criminals who teach them techniques. It also eventually
releases most prisoners into a society from which they have become even
more estranged than they were before their imprisonment and in which they
lack resources to cope in any way other than renewed resort to crime.
(Edelman, 1988, p. 68)
Distinction Between Onstage Action and Backstage Action
The conventional view of policy asks the key question: who reaps the benefits and
who bears the burdens and costs of a policy? The traditional view defines policy as the
authoritative allocation of values. Of an educational policy one ought to ask how it
affects the resources and opportunities of students, educators, and the public as a whole;
how it spreads the risks and cushions the blows that sometimes attend to policies and
programs.
In the political spectacle there is a sharp distinction between those values allocated
to the general public and those values that are allocated to a favored few. Edelman
believes that only a few members of society reap real benefits. These benefits include
material profits—dollars and cents, contracts and tax abatements. But they also
encompass opportunities for political office and administrative posts, such as
ambassadorships. In addition, we would include real benefits to the status or public
relations image of a person or organization (which then can be parlayed into material
benefits). Finally we include benefits to special interest groups with particular ideologies
and contacts with the politician. Benefits such as these are negotiated behind the scene
and out of sight.
Political spectacle theory such as Edelman's and revisionists theories such as
Stone's challenge our perspectives on school policy. In the following case history we
record not only the radical changes in one district experienced in a single decade and
more importantly, the process by which the changes were made. No conventional theory
of policy change explains it. Each element of political spectacle theory shapes the
changes that occurred.

School Choice in the Perfect Town10
Boulder, Colorado, ought to have been the last place where unhappy parents should
seek escape from the public schools. In 1989, Boulder Valley School District could
boast that it had responded to the full program of progressivism. Scores on achievement
tests were high, as one would expect from the district's demographic profile. Up to that
time, the public was generally satisfied with the quality of schools (or at least complaints
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were no more than what one would typically expect in suburban schools) and
demonstrated this satisfaction by passing most bond issues the district proposed.
Typical students in the valley attended public schools in their neighborhoods. Two
small, expensive and elite private schools, one parochial school, and a residential school
for problem students drew only a tiny percentage of eligible students away. The town of
Boulder proper had long ago reached icon status, a desirable place to live, a place of
natural beauty and liberal politics. Years of focusing on the preservation of its
environment and quality of life had led city councils to adopt open space ordinances and
control growth.
Demographic trends, including in-migration from the west coast and ordinances to
control growth inside the city, infused new money and contributed to vast expansion
outside of the city in surrounding communities east of Boulder, filling existing schools
and pressuring the district to build new ones. Housing costs skyrocketed inside the city
limits. Young, middle class families soon found the costs too high, so that, as the
children in city schools grew up, no new children took their desks. City schools soon
found themselves short of students and at risk of being closed. Increasingly, students
from one neighborhood were bused to another. It sometimes seemed that kids from the
mobile home parks or low-income housing were most often the ones on buses. In the
schools with the most affluent parents, the periodic threats of closure were successfully
fought off even when many of its chairs remained empty.
Deep currents of social change began to threaten the apparent consensus on
education. The small university town of the 1950s and 60s and the laid back liberal
sanctuary of the 1970s and 80s had begun to give way to a much more affluent and
conservative population, people with different ideas and expectations for the education
of their children. Conspicuous consumption altered the previously egalitarian social
landscape. The school district, however, did not yet feel this local social current as it
occupied itself with implementing a complete package of progressive reforms.
Progressive School Restructuring
In keeping with its progressive policies and in response to nationwide restructuring
efforts in public education, the Boulder Valley School District (BVSD) adapted a middle
school philosophy in 1989. The middle school restructuring, to be phased in by fall
1992, followed the report of the Carnegie Commission entitled Turning Points. That
policy document recommended that schools for young adolescents be reorganized so that
students from sixth through eighth grade could be placed, not in homogeneous ability
groups but mixed with students of all types and levels of prior achievement. Instruction
should be delivered in blocks, so students could spend longer periods of time with
teachers who covered multi-curricular areas. The centerpiece of the philosophy was its
focus on practices appropriate to the developmental needs and characteristics of young
adolescents. The resulting programs would feature thematic and integrated instruction
that followed student interests. In the plan for district restructuring, the aim would be to
make schools more effective for all students. Most teachers and parents who participated
in restructuring plans called this "the middle school philosophy." Conflict over the
middle school philosophy would soon erupt into broad institutional changes over the
next decade in Boulder.
In January of 1990, the district hired Dean Damon,11 a known innovator and
progressive educator, as superintendent. Damon set up School Improvement Teams
(SIT), the Institute for Development of Educational Activities schools (IDEA), and Site
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Based Management (SBM). All of this alphabet soup of restructuring consisted of
teachers, parents and administrators at schools throughout the district. They met
regularly to envision a new direction for education with a focus on site-based
decision-making and progressive reforms. By that time the district had a full staff of
specialists on various aspects of progressive curriculum and a thoroughgoing program of
professional development for teachers. Things seemed to be going well and going in a
particular direction.
Choice Options Introduced by the District
The initial school choice options that the district launched matched its vision for
progressive education. For nonconformist students the district had already opened, in
1988, an alternative school based on William Glasser's philosophy of reality therapy and
integrated pedagogy. For its patrons who favored a wholistic and student- centered
program, the district opened an elementary school in 1991. For parents wishing bilingual
education for their children, the district opened an elementary school in that same year,
where Spanish-speaking children would learn English (and English-speaking children
could learn Spanish) along with their academic subjects. Each of these schools operated
as a magnet school that any parent in the district could select over their neighborhood
schools. And in each instance, designing, planning, and implementing were conducted
by professionals in concert with the parent groups, with rich contributions from the
experts in curriculum and pedagogy from the district office.
First Sounds of Discontent
Those initial forays into choice by the local district ignored or contradicted the
discourse about schools at the national level, exemplified by A Nation at Risk. Whatever
the condition of public schools elsewhere, Boulder schools were not in a state of crisis.
The message of national school crisis was first brought to the Boulder consciousness by
Janet Jones, a parent from the affluent southwest corner of Boulder. She believed—and
a considerable number of other parents believed with her—that the district plans would
de-emphasize rigorous academic preparation. She focused her attention especially on the
plan for converting junior high schools to middle schools. She believed that this
reorganization would reduce the already declining academic performance of Boulder
schools, and, more especially, would end up detracting from her own children's
education. She based her complaints on her analysis of district achievement test scores.
Not receiving any attention or satisfaction from the district, she next took her statistics to
the local newspaper, the Boulder Daily Camera, which not only published her analysis
but also endorsed its findings and recommendations:
The excellence of Boulder Valley schools is widely taken for granted, but
this analysis by a parent and informed critic suggests a deepening
mediocrity. Her prescription: Take the system back from the education
"experts" and restore a real commitment to academic excellence.
Media Creating Spectacle
If the Camera had taken a balanced position on the subject of school achievement it
would have reanalyzed test scores to confirm or disconfirm Jones's interpretation. Or,
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newspaper staff might have interviewed internationally recognized experts in testing
who worked at the university. It might at least have requested clarification and
reinterpretation by the appropriate district officials. The Camera, however, did none of
these things. Instead it accepted Jones's claim that achievement was declining in Boulder
and even referred to her as an "informed critic." It punched up the message of discontent
and crisis by printing a half-page cartoon depicting a student with a dunce cap in one
hand and a mortarboard in the other. Although the Camera printed a variety of letters to
the editor on both sides of this debate (more perhaps of the critical ones), a response
from Superintendent Damon did not appear until a month later. When he did respond,
Damon defended the district restructuring and the goal of improving education for
all—for the common good. In his op-ed piece, he claimed Jones's analysis was wrong
and showed that, by using the correct metric recommended by the test publisher, most of
Boulder schools exceeded expectations and were high over all. In contrast with the torrid
and emotional language of Jones and her group, Damon's language was measured,
rational, and tepid—almost offhand.
Aware of the threat that lay behind Jones's analysis of Boulder school achievement,
the district hired Lew Romagnano, associate professor from Metro State University, to
analyze math achievement test scores from 1987-1995. His analysis showed that,
contrary to the Jones conclusion, "the district's efforts to improve the mathematics
education of its students have already begun to show positive results."
But you cannot un-ring a bell. By the time Professor Romagnano pointed out the
fallacies of Jones's analysis, the picture of mediocrity she constructed had impressed
itself on the public consciousness.
The Jones episode illustrates some principles of political spectacle theory and the
role of media. First, a political agenda is usually launched by an actor who bases his or
her message of crisis by reporting statistics more dramatic than technically accurate. The
apparently scientific reports provide the illusion of rationality so necessary to policy
makers. In this case, Jones intended for her analysis to provide the pretext for adoption
of school choice policies as well as exclusive programs for the top students. Second,
newspapers construct and reinforce a sense of crisis in policy matters. As noted above,
the Camera could have checked to see if her analysis created or reflected a factual
decline in district performance. Third, media reduce complex situations to simple sound
bites and visual symbols, such as the mortarboard cartoon and the table of scores that
Jones created. Fourth, media take strong perspectives on policy issues and craft news
articles and select or solicit opinion pieces that reinforce those perspectives. It seems
clear that Jones's opinion piece reflected a point of view that was held by the Camera.
From 1991 to 1997, few articles and opinion pieces that the Camera published were
favorable to district schools. Fifth, the perspective that local newspapers take is often
consistent with corporate interests nationally rather than local concerns.12 During these
years the Camera took an anti-public school and pro-choice perspective that echoed the
national discourse about the decline of schools. In addition, the newspaper seemed to
align with the elite critics, irrespective of local evidence to the contrary. Paraphrasing
David Berliner and Bruce Biddle, choice advocates and the local media had
"manufactured a crisis" (Berliner and Biddle, 1995). Political spectacle thrives on a
sense of crisis even when a fair reading of the local facts shows otherwise.
The Rise of the Local Elite
Scholars define "elites" in various ways. For example Harold Lasswell defined
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elites as the "influential" (Lasswell, 1965). Amy Stuart Wells and Irene Serna defined
local elites as "those with a combination of economic, political, and cultural capital that
is highly valued within their particular school community" (Wells and Serna, 1996, p.
94).
Many people who fall into these categories would object to their inclusion. But, as
Edelman argued, it is essential in the political spectacle to appear to be both democratic
and rational, even though one's true intentions and actions point toward private benefits
backstage and out of sight. In the conflict that followed, critics of choice often used the
word elite to refer to the programs that Parents and Schools (the group that formed to
resist Superintendent Damon's progressive reforms) created. The elites, meanwhile,
rejected the label and jeered its use. For example,when choice parents crowed about high
test scores, choice critics attributed those scores to the privileged status of "elite"
students. Angry choice parents countered:
This is misinformed at best, and a deliberate lie for the purposes of political
attack …. Their [Adams parents'] xenophobia is the true elitism and
prejudice."
No one active in his or her child's education, whether through Parents
and Schools, a school committee, a booster club, or otherwise, needs to
apologize for trying to "get what they want for their kid." Many of the
interests of each of our children are not for everyone, but this fact should
certainly not diminish our commitment. If the school district has a problem
with that, so be it.
On the other hand, some members embraced this designation, as one can see from
the following letters to the Camera:
The argument for denying the option for hard academics seems rooted in the
notion that a sense of inferiority will be engendered in those students who
do not avail themselves of the opportunity. The entire program thereby
grovels for inferiority…. The above observation will draw charges of
elitism. Yes, and the world is based on elitism, delineated by those who can
and those who can't process and communicate information (Smith, 1995a,
3B).
Our goal should be singularly directed at assuring every BVSD kid the
opportunity to end up at the upper end of the food chain (Smith, 1995a, 3B).
Radical egalitarianism has become the basis for a scorched earth policy
when it comes to academic rigor. Something happened to public education a
few decades ago, around the time that the federal government injected itself
and social engineering into the process. A cannibal joined the family picnic
and calmly began to eat the children. Perhaps in a couple of decades … we
will all conclude that certain things, like war and public education, are too
important to be left to the experts and politicians (Smith, 1995b, 4C).
Credit Janet Jones for tapping into a reservoir of discontent among affluent parents,
particularly about district plans to convert junior highs to middle schools and to
eliminate tracking students by ability. Among the well-educated and affluent parents
whom Jones enlisted was Nobel prize-winning chemist Tom Cech, a professor at the
University of Colorado. Cech added his voice and prestige to Jones's group and recruited
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other well-educated, powerful parents, many from the scientific community. This core
group called a meeting in March of 1992 to challenge Superintendent Damon and the
board of education. Five hundred people, almost all critical of district programs,
attended this meeting. The core group administered a questionnaire. The results of this
poll showed that the majority in attendance favored academic rigor, doubted the middle
school philosophy and claimed that the district was unresponsive to the concerns of
parents. Thus the activists formed the group called group Parents and Schools. Soon the
group was making headlines. For example, a Camera headline read, "District is under
siege: Organized Parents Posed to Change the School System." Local and national
political and educational experts said that the group possessed the characteristics of a
"powerful political movement:"
Its message is broad. It uses both passionate rhetoric and quantitative
research. Its leaders are well known and have captured community attention.
In April, Parents and Schools circulated a petition that reflected the themes of the
March poll. It presented this petition, with over 3000 signatures, to the school board.
The board, however, refused to back away from its plan for middle school restructuring.
Undaunted by the board's decision, the activists continued organizing.
Parents and Schools aimed first to organize political action that would force the
district to offer school choice. To this end the group began a campaign to recruit and
expand its membership to others who were critical of schools. Indeed, the rhetoric of
Parents and Schools was almost exclusively critical, even damning and derisive. With
Jones as its leader, Parents and Schools put together an e-mail network. It regularly
published a newsletter that disseminated reports and letters critical of the schools and
promoting their slant on curriculum and school organization. Through this
communication network members were encouraged to speak out to the district
administration, school board members, teachers and the public about the lack of
academic rigor in the school system. One Parents and Schools newsletter solicited
"horror stories:"
Stories Sought: What is your favorite example of the lack of challenge to
students in our schools? Please send your 'horror story' to Parents and
Schools.
A letter writing campaign was organized, and the Camera published dozens of
letters critical of the district's plans. Parents and Schools enlarged its power through
networking. Many members also participated on school governance groups and
site-based teams. They used these groups as platforms to express their complaints about
the district and recruit more parents. Through extensive media coverage, the group had
convinced many that the public schools in Boulder were failing and that immediate
action was necessary. One of its first action items was to pressure the district to institute
an International Baccalaureate (IB) program at one of the high schools. The IB program
would offer students a rigorous curriculum and an internationally recognized diploma.
For Parents and Schools, this program was an antidote to what they saw as the
watered-down district curriculum and just the thing to provide an edge for their children
into the most desirable college. Always the group used the threat of voucher legislation
and charter schools to push their agenda of academic rigor.
Finally realizing the heat of dissatisfaction but suspicious of its extent and
distribution across the entire district, Superintendent Damon asked the League of
Women Voters to solicit a broader range of views from the community as a whole.
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Meanwhile the district fulfilled its plan to open the middle schools by the fall of 1992. It
assigned ninth graders (who previously would have been assigned to junior high) to high
school and students in grades six through eight to middle schools. Among other
consequences, the restructuring decreased elementary school enrollments by 15%—a
decrease in enrollment that would later prove to be significant in arguments about school
choice.
A comment from Superintendent Damon illustrates the district perspective at the
time.
The whole issue of focus schools was begun in this community as a way of
being responsive and at the same time, good stewards of resources,
responsive to a community that increasingly sees value in choice in public
education. They (the board) have done a number of things to try to
accommodate the community's interest in choice. One of them is the open
enrollment policy which has been liberalized incredibly in the last three
years because of legislative interest as well.
Choice and Political Spectacle
So far this story reflects positively on the arguments in favor of school choice.
Perhaps the "government" schools of Boulder were less than responsive to the demands
of parents. But the story can also be told through the lens of political spectacle.
Parents and Schools adopted the rhetoric of national achievement crisis, even
against the evidence of the local test scores. Edelman points out that policy makers and
political actors often invoke crises — whether real or not — to justify actions on behalf
of private rather than public values. In this case the parent group wanted schools to
return to homogeneous ability grouping and the most advanced and accelerated
academic courses. They wanted these options so that their children would receive the
most advanced and accelerated curriculum and preparation in academic subjects that
would pay off, they believed, in higher college entrance test scores and enhanced
transcripts. Parents and Schools lobbied the district to initiate a weighted grade system
so that students who took advanced classes could still attain perfect grade
averages.Whether the consequence of their proposed policy changes disadvantaged
anyone else's children was not their concern. They wanted to return to the way things
were before the progressive restructuring. This was cultural restoration, writ small.
Was the reaction of the elite parents rational in its pursuit of individual interests?
Probably. Would attaining private goods accrue to the common good, as market theorists
claim? Would it not be more valuable for the society as a whole for the best students to
attain the best and highest academic slots? Would it not be more efficient? In the
political spectacle, one always must speculate about differences between on stage and
backstage benefits of policy decisions. Parents and Schools regularly claimed that the
common good would be served if the group attained its goals. After all, they reasoned,
every parent would have the right to choose, so everyone would benefit. Based on their
private words and actions, however, it seems clear that its members pursued private,
individual goals through the manipulation of public policy and public institutions.
David Labaree argued that a retreat from broad public interests toward private ones
is a feature of a society that is driven by the values of social mobility rather than
democratic equality or even human capital. At a time when the number of people
attaining any given level of educational credential (junior high graduation, high school
diploma, junior college certificate, college graduation, and so on up the educational
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pyramid) is increasing, the market value of that credential goes down. The newly
dominant perception in American society identifies education as a commodity that
individuals can acquire and then use to exchange for better positions in the occupational
or educational world. Furthermore, the credential race is a zero-sum game; one person
only gains relative to another's loss. As more people gain a credential, the elite of society
press for higher standards and more selectivity at the next level, because they want to
preserve their existing standing in a hierarchical social order whose topmost places
become ever more scarce as the population size increases (Labaree, 1997).
Labaree's argument implies that elite parents in Boulder were trying (whether
intentionally or unconsciously) to position their children more favorably to compete for
the best spots at the next educational level. A rigorous and exclusive academic
experience at junior high might get their children into the honors track at Boulder High,
which would position them to gain admission to a prestigious university, which could
then lead to better law schools, and so on. But acquiring these commodities for their
own children also had the consequence of denying them to other children. Pursuing
credentials to the detriment of others, however, was not part of the discourse onstage.
Local and Non-Local Discourse on School Choice
By 1992, Parents and Schools had tapped into an abundant source of pro-choice
discourse. Communication and consultation networks provided advice, canned
arguments, and "research" that supported "solutions" to "crises" of school
achievement—more educational options—different choices. It tapped into both national
and local advocacy papers, for example, a report by Professor Richard Kraft of the
University of Colorado. The Independence Institute, (a conservative think tank designed
to do the political work of the Coors family) published and distributed the report, which
recommended that Colorado adopt a choice policy. The purpose of the paper was to
influence state legislators who were then considering various plans including vouchers.
Citizen groups had brought forward several initiatives, and in spite of its conservative
origins, this paper and many others galvanized support for choice across the political
spectrum.
In November 1992, Colorado voters defeated a measure that would have provided
school vouchers statewide. Heeding polling results, advocates for choice realized that
sufficient support for vouchers was lacking, they instead concentrated on the next best
alternative: Charter schools. Advocates showered legislators with papers and briefs put
out by various foundations and think tanks. They pushed newspapers to promote the
values of choice. They sponsored a Charter School conference designed to win over
enough legislators to pass the bill. Through their efforts, a long list of legislators in both
houses sponsored the bill, which passed in 1993 with strong majorities.
Unlike charter school legislation in, for example, Arizona, Colorado's was not
particularly permissive (or, as choice advocates usually describe it, "strong"). The law in
fact placed charter schools within district governance. That is, private groups or
individuals inside district boundaries could propose charters, but the local board would
have to approve those proposals. A result of this devolved decision-making about charter
schools created substantial variation among districts in both the number of charter
schools they approved and the extent of oversight each district imposed.13
Suborning Participatory Democracy in Boulder
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In his attempt to get a handle on the extent of the public's criticism of the
progressive reforms underway, Damon asked for help from a respected outside agency,
the League of Women Voters. The League attempted to address this request by hosting
aconference to discuss the direction of public education and propose a new plan. They
wanted democratic participation by all the community, every constituency. To
accomplish this the League appointed parents and educators to a planning committee.
After the initial planning sessions, however, Parents and Schools staged a protest,
withdrew its members from both the planning committee and threatened to withdraw its
members from the conference itself. In a letter to the League president, Parents and
Schools stated that the proposal for the conference was the work of the superintendent
and "smacks of the kind of manipulated, impotent "process" that has frustrated many
parents and contributed mightily to the district's current plight."
Apparently, the League's efforts were too democratic for Parents and Schools,
which then began planning a conference of its own. Despite its earlier withdrawal, when
the League-sponsored conference finally commenced in February of 1993, Parents and
Schools people turned out in force.
The conference agenda called for dividing into small groups, each with a separate
issue to discuss in regard to the future of education in Boulder. One of those groups was
"Choice Vision" whose assignment was to discuss the possibility of choice schools in
the district. More than one third of the members of the group of 33 was affiliated with
Parents and Schools, including Janet Jones and her husband. After the conference, a
spin-off of the Choice Vision group was formed, made up of primarily Parents and
Schools members. The stacking of the committee precluded open debate about both the
pros and the cons of charter schools and other choice options. The self-selected
composition of the subgroup co-opted the agenda and transformed itself into an
advocacy committee. Thereafter, this subgroup was absorbed by Parents in Schools, but
still retained the semblance of a League and district sponsored, fair-minded free-speech
deliberation.
The spin-off Choice Vision Action group planned a second conference three
months later that they called the Conference on Magnet Programs for BVSD. The
district name was part of the conference title that made it appear to be district sponsored,
but it was not. This time there was not even the semblance of district involvement that
might have assured a broader perspective or any voice for the good of all. To symbolize
its autonomy from the district, the group invited the superintendent to attend as just
another conferee, like the parents or other invited guests. Because the Choice Vision
Action group relied on Parents and Schools to publicize the Conference on Magnet
Programs with its well-organized network of parent volunteers, the composition of the
magnet school conference, its agenda, and guest speakers were all controlled by Parents
and Schools. The mailing address for the conference was also the Parents and Schools
mailing address, the home of Janet Jones. The group prepared summaries and full news
releases for the media. Most of the names listed as further contact resources were
Parents and Schools members. Two of those members were employees of the Colorado
Department of Education. Another member sat on the Governor's Advisory Council for
Math and Science. Nineteen days after the Conference on Magnet Schools was held in
Boulder, Governor Roy Romer signed the Colorado Charter School Act of 1993.
Focus Schools in Boulder: Threats and Opportunities
The district was already changing. The hard work and diligence of Jones and
Parents and Schools paid off when the district approved adoption of the International
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Baccalaureate program at Willowbrook High School. To Parents and Schools, "this is
just the beginning."
In the summer of 1993, anticipating the effects of the new charter school
legislation, Lydia Swize, Executive Director for Administrative Services for the district,
assembled a group of parents and administrators. Their task was to design a process by
which schools or private groups could apply for a new kind of school: a Focus School.
Focus schools would function much as magnet schools (like those that operate in other
parts of the country, primarily to desegregate urban districts). Like magnets, focus
schools would draw students from throughout the district to schools with a specific
curricular emphasis.
Both district administrators and choice advocates defined focus schools as
alternatives to charter schools, but they imagined different kinds of functions. District
employees imagined that focus schools would satisfy advocates of charter schools (the
more extreme solution) as well as redistribute students to under-enrolled schools. Choice
advocates, on the other hand, imagined that focus schools would be the thin edge that
would eventually widen toward charters.14
The contrasts between charter and focus schools were ones of relative autonomy
and application of market ideology. In the public arena choice advocates concentrated on
those values. A charter school had to be approved by the district, and if approved, the
district had to fund it. Once the money was assigned to the charter school, the district
would have little control over day-to-day operation. A charter school could waive the
district policies and contracts. In contrast, to establish a focus school in Boulder, the
parties did not have to adhere to state oversight, and the application process was much
simpler and more streamlined than what one had to do to apply for a charter. Once
approved, the focus school would have to provide students with the district curriculum
as well as any specialized curriculum inherent in the focus application (e.g., Montessori
or Core Knowledge). It would be funded by the district, would have to comply with
district policies and the teacher contract. The budget of the two options differed as well.
Funding for focus schools remained under the authority of the district. Students who
joined charter schools, in contrast, took the amount of their expenditure with them. In
retrospect, it is easy to see why the district favored focus schools.
Five administrators, three parents, and one teacher sat on the Process Design
Committee for Focus Schools in late summer 1993. In addition to these members, Dr.
Lydia Swize functioned as the group's facilitator. Although charter schools were
intended to allow teachers and parents to design effective schools, the focus school
committee had only one teacher member, the president of the Boulder Valley Education
Association (BVEA). In any event, all three parents were active members of Parents and
Schools—including Janet Jones. The group constructed a process that individuals would
need to follow to design a focus school.

"Designing Our Dream School"
Looking back two years, while the political movement for choice developed to
influence district governance, Parents and Schools served as a focal point for individuals
disenchanted with their neighborhood schools for various personal reasons.
Jane Barillo disliked whole language and blamed this progressive approach for her
daughter's inability to spell or write. When she asked her daughter's teacher to provide
spelling instruction, she was told to buy her daughter a spell checker. Later, Jane's
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husband Jeff campaigned successfully for membership on the School Improvement
Team in the hope of influencing school practices and found the staff intransigent on the
question of basic skills versus whole language. The staff seemed to feel that instructional
decisions should be made by trained professionals but Jane began to dwell on what she
and her husband defined as absence of accountability—to her family—of the school,
principal and teachers.
Jane's neighbor happened to be Janet Jones, the founder of Parents and Schools,
who shared her analysis of test scores with Jane and Jeff. This seemed to confirm their
growing belief that district schools were declining. Jones also gave them information
about the emerging options of school choice in the district and state.
Jane ran into Maria, an old friend, while shopping for groceries. Maria had been
frustrated by the district's failure to provide the services required for her gifted child.
Maria had to fill in the void with academic activities at home. She had complaints about
the music teacher. Since the school would not remove the teacher, Maria removed her
daughter from music class and even showed up during music period to supervise her
daughter. She campaigned to remove a principal she didn't think was effective.
Together the two friends discussed their frustrations and the declining test scores.
They began meeting periodically to discuss what could be done. Jones put them in touch
with Kay Harbruck whom Jones had pegged as a critic of the district, but in her case it
was the vocational programs that she deemed a failure.
Dot Enwall was a well-respected teacher, having taught foreign language at the
secondary level in BVSD for 14 years. For a frustrating year and a half she had worked
as the foreign language coordinator for the district. She believed that teachers had too
much autonomy and not enough accountability and that they jumped too quickly on any
new fad that came their way. Now that her daughter neared school age, she began to
pursue the idea of an alternative school. Janet Jones introduced her to Dot and Jane.
After much discussion, they decided to propose a focus school rather than go
through the tedious work of applying for a charter. The group then turned to curriculum
and teaching methodology. Although the four parents seemed sure of what they didn't
want for their children, formulating a plan for what they did want was more difficult.
Reasoning that the district would be more likely to respond favorably to a program with
a national cachet, they fixed on Core Knowledge, a program that Parents and Schools
targeted as promising. As the group studied the literature that Jones provided, Core
Knowledge sounded promising. Their beliefs matched those of its creator, E. D. Hirsch,
that there were facts that every student in America should know. The package that
Hirsch sells focuses on basic skills. After the skills are mastered, the program takes them
to ever higher levels of knowledge. The women began to think of themselves as the Core
Knowledge group. With the help of Parents and Schools they arrived at a school name,
Apex Elementary School. News of their plans spread through the affluent southwest
corner of Boulder where they all lived.
In summer of 1994, district Executive Director Lydia Swize met with Apex
founders and seemed satisfied with its proposal for Core Knowledge. Now came the
question of where to put the school. Swize suggested that the founders hold meetings to
gauge which schools might be interested in inviting Apex to share its facilities. Of
course, the founders would have preferred their own building, but this did not seem to be
a reasonable possibility. Swize named the buildings that were then or would soon be
under capacity: Stonegate, Franklin, and Adams Elementary schools, all on the south
side of town.
Capacity was a central issue in the district, which had to balance the demand for
new schools in the east suburbs with the needs of each city school to survive. In the
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previous year, in fact, Swize had met with the staff of each school in the district that
threatened to fall below the dreaded ratio of enrollment to number of seats. When she
met with Stonegate staff and parents, she let them know that closure was a distinct
possibility. To prevent that eventuality, Swize said, the staff and parents might consider
the possibility of inviting a Focus School into its building. The school would operate as
two different entities within a single school building. She hinted that a group of parents
were in the process of designing such a focus school for south Boulder.
Versions differ about what happened at that meeting, whether Swize had merely
hinted about or in fact had formally notified the staff and parents that the board had
already pegged Stonegate as the primary contender to site Apex.
Apex founders held its initial meeting in August 1994, at Stonegate. The meeting
was well attended. Although its stated purpose was to provide information about the
proposed focus school, the Stonegate community believed it had been targeted. The
defenses went up.
Stonegate staff and parents strongly opposed any action that would threaten the
integrity of their school. They had explored, since Swize's meeting the previous spring,
alternative means for increasing enrollment or otherwise warding off this, as they saw it,
attack. By October, when the board announced that Stonegate was a likely choice for
siting Apex, a full counter offensive was under way.
Stonegate's well-educated, affluent corps of active parents held neighborhood
meetings, gave short speeches at school board meetings, wrote letters and phoned
members of the school board and Superintendent Damon. They engineered a letter
writing campaign to the Camera and distributed flyers and letters to all the homes in the
neighborhood. In addition, a "Town Meeting" was held at Stonegate two days before the
board was scheduled to consider the Apex and Montessori proposals for focus schools.
When the board met on October 25 most of Stonegate's teachers and parents were there
to press their case. Thirteen of them spoke, relating their concerns: that Stonegate had
been left out of the planning phase of placement; that plans for placement had been
rushed through; and that sharing the building would have a negative impact on both
programs. They also brought with them a plan to turn their whole school into its own
focus school, operating as a magnet for families throughout the district to choose. In
contrast with the Apex focus, Stonegate Focus would retain its identity as a
student-centered school with progressive curriculum and pedagogy. It would remain as a
neighborhood but attract students from outside its boundaries to its progressive
curriculum. More importantly from their point of view, this focus would be planned and
implemented by teachers with parents rather than by parents alone, as was true of
Apex.15
The board decided to find another place for Apex. It cited several reasons, but
Stonegate's successful defense lay mainly in the economic and political clout of the
families in the neighborhood who overwhelmingly supported Stonegate as it was.
With its new insights about allegiances between staff and parents of neighborhood
schools, and without any guidelines to follow for siting focus schools, the school board
turned its attention toward other schools with unfilled seats. Franklin Elementary, which
was part of the less affluent part of south Boulder proved to be an inviting target.
Enrollment at Franklin had been declining for years, but the board had kept it open to
provide temporary housing for the overflow from the suburbs. Trying not to repeat the
Stonegate mistakes, Swize convened meetings between the Apex planners and Franklin
staff and parents (which were no less unhappy than Stonegate had been about the
prospect of siting Apex there).16 By then the board was fully aware that, although few
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had ever raised objections to the idea of choice, the siting decisions were turning into
political nightmares.
Finally a solution was proposed. The first two focus schools approved (Apex and
Montessori) would be sited at an annex of Madison Elementary School. The annex
would be empty the following fall. The Madison community had planned to add new
language programs to be housed in the annex for its considerable population of children
of foreign students at the university as well as a magnet bilingual education program for
children bused in from the rest of the city. Last minute notification prevented the
Madison community from pressing its case.
The board's next move foreshadowed problems to come. It appointed Claire Sauer
as principal of both Apex in the Annex and of Adams Elementary School. The board
reasoned in public that Adams would soon lose its bused children from the eastern
suburbs to their new neighborhood school. As a result, Adams enrollment would then
shrink by half. Clare Sauer could surely handle both assignments.
Following months of planning and staffing, Apex and Montessori focus schools
opened their doors at the Madison annex. But everyone acknowledged that neither
school could stay there for long. Both were filled to their capacity and already planning
to expand, and the Annex had no more space. So the politically charged process of siting
them more permanently began again. But this time, Apex had an advantage: a
sympathetic principal it shared with Adams.
To the school board, siting Apex at the Adams building made sense. Nevertheless,
it put off the political conflict until the election in November.
In September, a new east side school opened and 300 previously bused children
who lived in its catchment area, along with their prized teachers and fund-raising
parents, moved out of Adams. As eagerly as the Apex group looked to its future, Adams
staff and neighborhood somberly contemplated its own. Sensing the inevitable course of
policy, Clare Sauer, shared principal, suggested that the Adams School Improvement
Team meet with the Apex group, as a friendly, welcoming gesture. The early meeting
went well as the three parent leaders discovered what seemed to be similar goals for
their children. There was no reason to believe that the two schools could not form a
productive relationship.
Sometime before the November school board election, however, Adams parents
had a change of heart. Principal Sauer hinted about the desire of Apex founders to
maintain a "separate identity" from Adams. Ensuing phone conversations between
representatives of the two schools confirmed the rumor that Apex parents did not want
the two school populations to mix. To the Adams parents, the phrase "separate identity,"
was really a code for segregation of children from the two schools. Mutual wariness and
suspicion clouded subsequent relations. With little time to spare before the school board
made its final siting decision, Adams parents attempted to organize its opposition. They
wrote letters to the school board, superintendent, and the Camera and held neighborhood
meetings, but it was really too late. Unlike the parents at Stonegate, Adams parents
possessed little ammunition—what some writers refer to as cultural capital—to effect
the course of politics in the district and city. 17
While the Apex founders pursued a "separate identity" from Adams, Parents and
Schools directed its political activities toward the next election and the composition of
the school board.
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Colonizing the School Board
The school board election in November 1993 added two new faces and a shattered
consensus on the board in regard to progressive restructuring. Although not among the
founding members of Parents and Schools, Stephanie Hult and Kim Saporito were
certainly sympathetic to its mission, always keeping "academic excellence" at the
forefront of any debate. This was not the board majority they had hoped and campaigned
for, but Parents and Schools finally placed some advocates there. As long as they were in
the minority, they could not change policy. They could, however, radically change the
style of discourse in board meetings. And change it they did, and made civility a thing of
the past.
In 1994, as the focus school drama played out, one school board member resigned,
leaving room for an appointee to complete the term. Of the fourteen who applied, the
board voted unanimously for Don Shonkweiler. It soon became clear that Shonkweiler's
ideas about education were closer to those of Hult and Saporito than to the board's
majority.
The diligence of Parents and Schools, meanwhile, began to pay off when an
International Baccalaureate program opened at Willowbrook High. In addition, one high
school opened as a focus school and a middle school applied for a charter. Parents and
Schools viewed the IB program as having a "ripple effect" on the rest of the district.
Right away, the group began to push for a pre-IB program in a middle school that would
prepare students for the IB program.
Parents and Schools went to work in earnest as they planned for the 1995 election.
Professing interests in equity, its candidates practiced stealth techniques, keeping much
of their platform out of public view. In November, an incumbent and another candidate
that Parents and Schools endorsed won the election and shifted the board majority.
Within its first five weeks, the new board, which everyone referred to as the Hult board,
approved seven applications for focus schools and one charter school. The placement of
Apex at Adams was one of those decisions.
Relations between the board and founders of Parents and Schools changed
drastically. The new board majority appropriated Parents and Schools goals for its own.
Academic excellence, choice and fiscal responsibility were its top stated priorities. Then
the board went to work on a different variety of restructuring.
The Hult board made no secret of their disdain for the past reforms (e.g., middle
school restructuring, inclusion, heterogeneous grouping, collaborative, site-based
decisions made by parents and teachers, and progressive pedagogy). Empowered by the
"will of the voters," the school board immediately got to work on the agendas of the new
majority, spending most of its time approving various focus schools,
schools-within-schools, "strands" within schools, and wholesale adoption of basic skills
curriculum for elementary schools. So much choice activity went on that the board
finally had to declare a moratorium to catch its breath. And even after that, groups
approached the board behind the scenes to press for additional choices, and in some
cases, getting them.
But not everyone got to choose.
Within the administration building a new type of "restructuring" was occurring.
Since the 1970's the district boardroom placed the board members and the
superintendent at a long, slightly elevated table in front of a small auditorium. Soon after
the election, Superintendent Damon's seat was lowered to spectator level. This gesture
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Efforts of Parents and Schools to portray itself in a good light exemplifies
Edelman's theory of the social construction of self, friends, enemies, and leaders. The
group did not forbear from manipulating symbols and statistics to promote its image and
mission. Beginning with Janet Jones's misleading analysis of achievement scores in
1991, there followed a series of other such attempts. For example, Jones often cited
studies that she claimed demonstrated the effectiveness of Core Knowledge and of its
effectiveness for disadvantaged children. She did not (nor did the Core Knowledge
Foundation web site when we tried to track them down) provide the foundation for her
claim.21 In another example, Parents and Schools compared the achievement scores of
children in schools of choice with children in neighborhood schools and attributed the
advantage to superiority of the curriculum of choice schools. It ignored the selectivity of
choice schools. It ignored lower class size and the amenities at choice schools. Instead, it
attributed the higher test scores of schools of choice to parent involvement and superior
programs. No matter how fallacious such accounts are constructed, the public seems not
to question their validity. Nor did experts try to correct the misleading use of statistics.
When ordinary citizens raised doubts, Parents and Schools called them amateurs,
statistical illiterates, or enemies of school choice. This is how research is used in the
political spectacle, as a rhetorical sword for partisans to wield, a way to appear rational
and technical without the discipline and even-handedness of science at its best.
District Accommodation
Parents and Schools could not have been so successful if the school district had not
accommodated its values and interests. By accommodation, we mean acquiescence—the
gradual adaptation of the institutional values and the common goals of the representative
body of decision-makers and administrators to the goals of a special interest.
This case study presents compelling evidence that district officials accommodated
choice parents. The election of pro-choice school board members constitutes legitimate
political activity. The accommodation by the district of political activities—both public
and private, both conscious and unconscious—constitutes the politics of spectacle,
bifurcating on-stage and back-stage actions. District officials accommodated simply by
looking away. Perhaps they accommodated out of fear of reprisals, political or
institutional. The Hult board's firing of administrators who challenged its pro-choice and
anti-progressive policies represents an institutional reprisal. The following quotation
from Parents and Schools literature represents a political threat of reprisal:
If the local school board refuses to approve requests for magnet programs
with merit, we will elect better representatives in November. There is
growing, powerful support for magnet programs in the state legislature and
in the Colorado Department of Education. If the charter schools legislation
is approved, as expected, during this session, we will have the option of
appealing local school board decisions on magnet programs. Parents have
the right and responsibility to define the education they want for their
children.
Perhaps district accommodation can be thought of as a way of avoiding trouble
from part of the community that had political power, as this quotation from a frustrated
critic suggests:
The Apex parent leadership has become absolutely intoxicated with the
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power the board majority increasingly bestows upon them.... Why is the
board majority willing to wholesale turnover the education of our children
to these zealots?
The district accommodated by failing to adjudicate conflict and weigh in with
factions with less power. Instead of substantive help the district offered only symbolic
democracy. An Adams parent commented on the conflict between the Adams and Apex
transition teams. Meeting of these committees:
...made this appear to be a decision that the school governing body, teachers
and parents, had actually made. But really we were just duped by the whole
process.... but the administration knew what was happening and they left it
up to her to maneuver it through. We were just a rubber stamp for a decision
that was already made. It had the appearance of a democratic process but it
really wasn't.
But was district accommodation inevitable? To answer we describe contrasting
cases of districts that acted differently.
In Boulder's closest neighbor to the north, St. Vrain Valley School District, elite
parents did not exert enough pressure on the district administration to obtain special
treatment. The superintendent and board took a strong stand when they declared that any
charter school in the district would be subject to strict oversight. In particular, the board
made known its intention to take legal action to counter any attempt to establish schools
that would select a single stratum from the student population. When asked to compare
the St. Vrain district with Boulder's, the board president stated that the St. Vrain
community was generally satisfied with its schools. Two applications for elementary
charter schools and one application for a charter high school were submitted. The board
ruled that since the two elementary school proposals were substantially the same, they
should be merged into one. That charter was subsequently approved and opened. The
board denied the only application for a charter high school application because the
proposal failed to include a "responsible" fiscal plan. The charter school applicants
appealed the district's decision to the Colorado Board of Education, an appeal built into
the Colorado law. The State Board overturned the district's decision, and the school
opened. Less than one year into its operation, the school's poor management had
culminated in financial shortages, and the district took over the school's operation.
Cherry Creek District south of Denver, with demographics similar to those of
Boulder, also provides relevant comparisons. The board approved only two choice
options because the programs proposed were different from the district's regular
programs. Elite parents exerted pressure, but a Cherry Creek administrator, responding
to a question about why so few choice schools operated there, said, "We fund our
schools and we know how to say no."
These two examples show that, even considering the pro-choice policies at the state
level, capitulation to the elite parents in Boulder was not inevitable. There were
alternatives that the district could have pursued that could have led, potentially, to a
more even-handed outcome. First, the district could have insured that all students had an
equal opportunity to enroll in choice programs. While racial quotas have recently been
ruled unconstitutional, the district could have required that choice schools enroll the
same percentage of free lunch students as reflected in the district. The net result of this
policy would tend to serve the same purpose as a racial quota. Second, the district could
have monitored enrollment procedures, particularly to insure that enrollment priority

24 of 41

pools of choice schools conformed to state law and district policy.22 Third, the district
could have required choice school applications to provide unique programs that did not
duplicate existing district programs. BVSD has many programs that market themselves
as academically rigorous. Fourth, the district administration or the board could have
closely scrutinized the business and financial plans and operations of the choice schools.
Although most choice schools in Boulder have not had financial problems, prudent
monitoring by the district would have required schools to follow policy regarding fund
raising and private donations.23 The district could have insisted upon broad and fair
discussions involving all constituency groups with a stake in the policy. It could have
intervened to make the discussions more equal. The district could have analyzed the
potential costs and risks of choice schools to the broader community. The district could
have performed an evaluation of the schools after they were in operation. The district did
none of these things.
Democracy: Deliberative and Faux
Just because the post-Hult board and administration did nothing to mitigate the
hegemony of elite parents does not mean it did nothing at all. What happened next
represents a triumph of symbolic politics over deliberative democracy.
Contemporary political theory and philosophy recommends democratic deliberation
as a way of broadening participation on civic projects and strengthening its fairness.
Amy Gutmann described the deliberative process as one of three cornerstones by which
citizens can deal with disagreements in democratic societies.
Procedures are necessary for the fair and peaceful resolution of moral
conflicts.... If political equals disagree on moral matters, the greater number
rather than the lesser number should normally rule.... But for procedures to
be fair, citizens must appreciate the value of fairness.... Fundamental
constitutional values...serve as constraints on majority rule.... American
constitutional democracy recognizes certain substantive values not only as
preconditions to a fair democratic process but also as fundamental values
independent of that process, and as such, they represent a second basis for
resolving political disagreements.... The third way that democracies can deal
with disagreements is by citizens and public officials deliberating over the
moral disagreements that proceduralism and constitutionalism, taken alone,
leave unresolved. Deliberation is public discussion and decision making
that aim to reach a justifiable resolution...and to live respectfully with those
reasonable disagreements that remain unresolvable..... individual citizens
should be regarded as moral agents who deserve equal respect in any
justifications of basic procedures and constitutional rights.... Deliberation
calls upon citizens and public officials to try to justify our political positions
to one another and in so doing to take into account the viewpoints of others
who reasonably disagree with us. (Gutmann, 2000, pp. 73-76)
When the post-Hult board in Boulder contemplated the complex set of changes that
the district had experienced over the previous decade, it backed away from confronting
them head on. The mood seemed to be that decisions already made to enhance school
choice could not be remade, even if the board had the political will to do so. Instead it
commissioned University of Colorado researchers Kenneth Howe and Margaret
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Eisenhart to study the consequences of school choice.
The district did not wait for the results of their study. Meanwhile, the new
superintendent still faced the dilemma of growth in the suburbs. To build new schools he
believed it was necessary to close some schools on the west side. His dilemma was how
to accomplish the closings without causing a new generation of political upheaval. An
administrator from that era admitted:
Parts of our community are much less likely to be included in an effort like
consolidation because of the perceived power of that community. That's a
hard issue but it's somewhat the way things are.... If they had a powerful
population maybe we wouldn't have chosen that school [for closure].
In April, 1998, the superintendent announced his "hit list" of schools under
consideration for closure. Some of the schools on the list had high rates of poor and
non-white students. The board called public meetings to present the proposal. The
meetings turned into shouting matches when neighborhood families resisted the district
proposal to close their schools. They complained that the district had neglected to inform
them or to give them a voice in the decisions. They argued that the district had failed to
justify its decision on adequate statistical information. Some members of the Facility
Master Plan committee, which the board had appointed to assist them, agreed with the
parents. The board retreated from its plans and postponed consolidation talks to a later
time when the public could be more involved.
In September the board passed a resolution to start a deliberative process to advise
the board on future school consolidation. Item #4 of the resolution stated:
That the Board make decisions regarding facility usage by January of 2001.
Implementation of any Board decision would take place no sooner than fall
of 2001, giving staff, students, and parents time for transition.
At the same time the Facility Master Plan Committee was working to gather
information about district buildings so that it could be used as a guide for future
decisions regarding facilities. Some committee members were concerned that
consolidation would necessitate bussing of children, which in turn would exacerbate
traffic and pollution problems. In September the committee presented its report to the
board. The Master Plan included 13 strategies to address enrollment shifts. One of those
strategies was school consolidation.
Since decisions regarding closures/consolidations are not popular with
affected neighborhoods, the School District should develop a
comprehensive public process for evaluating possible
consolidations/closures.
Thereafter, the board began discussions with the Colorado Association of School
Boards (CASB) to aid the district in designing a deliberative process. At first board
members seemed genuine in their efforts to gather information and include the public in
facilities usage decisions. But they also knew that a decision had to be reached.
Whatever their intentions, the deliberative process that CASB implemented failed to
yield recommendations. 24 Thus intentions failed to match policy instruments, but were
transformed in the process of implementation.25 By April, board minutes indicated a
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change in the committee's responsibilities. The committee would no longer advice the
board on school consolidation, as the resolution stated but rather deliberate as "a public
exercise."
The new charge to the Committee was to
...give the process legitimacy throughout the community; create a dialogue
with the entire community; reach out to community members whose voices
are not often heard; empower the committee to be productive by investing
them with the responsibility for the success of the process.
Thirty-six members were appointed to serve on the committee. Board members
appointed one member each. The rest of the members were selected to represent the
municipalities within the district as well as proponents of school choice. District
officials selected other members, primarily people of color, to insure diversity. Although
it was a goal to find representatives that hadn't already served on district committees,
many members were familiar faces to school district committees and politics. At the
time choice schools enrolled less than 15 percent of the district's students. Almost 33
percent of the group's representatives were affiliated with choice schools.
The first meeting for the deliberative process was held in April 1999. CASB
Facilitator Jane Urschel started the session by explaining the group's charge:
The board does not expect the community to make a decision-that is the
board's responsibility.... The advisory committee will not take a vote. Its job
is to help the citizens of the district deliberate and reach a "public
judgment." The board wants to "listen in" on the community as it works
toward a public judgment and wrestles with the tough choices confronting
the district.
One member took umbrage, saying afterwards:
I volunteered for the committee because the District's notice said that the
committee would be making recommendations to the Board about pressing
issues of closure/consolidation and choice.... It's a bait and switch.
A district administrator noted that committee members came with a variety of
expectations and personal agendas:
Some were there to fight consolidation. Some were there because of the
school choice stuff, to make sure their interests were being met. Most of
them came with some type of territory they were protecting.
During an 8-month period the advisory group met more than 12 times. Each session
was about three hours long. Members attempted to redirect the discussion to the issues
of closure, consolidation and choice, the topics they believed were the primary charge
they had been given. But Urschel insisted on the symbolic process of general discussion.
Finally, the committee members, many reluctantly, gave in.
The first task for the committee was to frame the issue the public would deliberate.
After many sessions the group framed the following question, "Making Choices: How
can we best use our resources to ensure all children receive an excellent education?" The
group then grappled with writing five responses, both pro and con, with arguments for
each. Committee members spent many sessions debating and refining the responses.

27 of 41

After eight months the question and responses were compiled into booklets that would
serve as the guide for future study circles that the public would be invited to participate
in.
In December 1999, as the committee finalized the booklets and before any study
circles had met, the board announced the closure of two elementary schools. There could
no longer be any mistake. The Committee was just a symbol, a shadow of democratic
deliberation, nothing like Gutmann's model. The board had based its decision on
recommendations that district administrators had made and on behind the scenes
discussions with its constituencies, but irrespective of the Committee. The marks of
choice advocates were apparent. According to a district administrator, during these
months, the parent board of Promontory Charter Middle School had:
...stayed very quiet during consolidation. They knew that if people caught
on to the possibility that they might get their own school they'd be ticked off
about it…. They were worried that if they were seen as advocating for it
(consolidation) it would fire up the opposition.
One board member commented to a small group of people that the Promontory
founder "was drooling" over this possibility of moving into one of those
soon-to-be-vacated elementary school buildings and having it for itself.
Most members of the deliberative process team were angry that the board would
proceed with such plans before the Deliberative Process had completed their work and
before the 2-year moratorium on school consolidation had lapsed:
We are a committee that is supposed to be pulling the community in to have
these conversations about what we want our district to look like. This big
heavy-duty stuff is going on over here by the administration and the school
board. Essentially it was a smoke screen because they never wanted to hear
from the community anyway. They decided that in order to have an
excellent education you had to close schools and that's what they were going
to do anyway.
At the center of much of the public debate on the board plans to consolidate was the
actual choice of schools:
When they actually closed and consolidated schools they hit the most
politically incompetent schools.... But not Jefferson! Those people created
politics. And nothing ever happens to Monroe because those people are too
politically suave.
The two schools destined for closure were located in neighborhoods like the Adams
neighborhood—some of the few affordable places left in Boulder for young families to
buy a home and where many less advantaged families lived. At one of them, for
example, thirty nine percent of its 312 students were eligible for free lunch (compared to
less than 20 percent across the district as a whole). Almost one-third were Limited
English Proficient (LEP). Forty-three percent were children of color. Once again, the
board had taken the more expedient route, targeting the families with the least cultural
capital, those who would likely put up the least resistance. It was unclear whether the
proposed closures would result in any savings.
The deliberative process committee, working in public, had contributed nothing to
the district's off-stage decision making. Specifically, said one member:
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The Ed center had no time, no respect, and no regard for this task force. It
was just thought of as a cumbersome waste of time.... They saw it as
something keeping them from doing their job. They wanted to get on with
closing schools and we were standing in their way.
Unlike the school district, the city of Boulder was committed to preserving its
neighborhood schools. One city council member discussed the possibility of using city
excise tax to keep the schools open. Although committing money from excise taxes
turned out to be illegal, city officials offered several recommendations to the board,
among them to give neighborhood children priority enrollment into schools converted to
choice schools. The city also recommended that the district conduct an impact study to
assess public and private costs for transportation, and a mitigation and safe access plan.
The board resisted any attempt by the city council to interfere with board decisions and
did not act on any of the city councils suggestions.
After the board made its official decision, one member of the Deliberative Process
committee resigned. Others stopped attending meetings. He commented:
I can't do this anymore. I'm not going to waste time on something irrelevant.
They (board members) wanted to get Promontory [charter school] in
somewhere and that was their hidden agenda. I think they ... decided it
among them because when they took the vote there was no discussion [at
the board meeting].
In February the few remaining Deliberative Process committee members—more
than half of them advocates of school choice --organized study circles to discuss the
question and responses they had spent the past year creating. Nineteen study circles were
held, none of them in the areas affected by the consolidation. The report the committee
issued to the board (August, 2000) contained five themes that the study circles
generated. But everyone was aware by then that any deliberation that took place did not
affect decisions made by the board, at most the committee served as a cover for
decisions on behalf of the most advantaged parts of the community, not necessarily for
the common good.

Choice Effects in Boulder and Beyond
Parents and Schools echoed neo-liberals worldwide when they claimed that choice
benefits all parts of society. They scoffed at the idea that choice policies actually
exacerbate existing inequalities in social life generally and school achievement
specifically. They discounted the possibility that families with fewer resources and less
cultural capital might lack complete information on which to make a choice or might
value schools in their neighborhood. They went further to label as "racist" any such
doubts. They held fast to the notion that free market solutions were preferable to
government imposed neighborhood school boundaries, which tended to isolate poor
children in bad schools. They ignored issues of community, transportation, and
dispositions that might discourage the willingness or ability of some people to make
such choices. So deep were the beliefs of the members of Parents and Schools that they
readily looked beyond equivocal or negative evidence or found reasons for discrediting
it.26
In the political spectacle, however, one set of claims is made onstage (e.g.,
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enhancing equity) and another is hidden behind the scenes (e.g., maintaining privilege).
In Edelman's words:
In politics, moreover, the incentive to preserve privileges or to end
inequalities is always crucial, offering fertile psychological ground for using
language and action strategically, including slippery definitions of means,
ends, costs, benefits, and rationality (Edelman, 1988, p. 109).
Clearly, elite parents manipulated the instruments of choice policy in Boulder. But
they were not alone. Research by Elizabeth Graue and Stephanie Smith showed that elite
parents used back-stage political pressure to undermine progressive reforms in math
classes. The educators had attempted to remove ability grouping and implement
problem-solving and cooperative learning. But the parents believed that homogeneous
classes with traditional instruction had successfully prepared their children to win the
credentials race, (Graue and Smith, 1996) as Labaree described it (Labaree, 1997).
In their study of schools that attempted to eliminate ability grouping, Amy Stuart
Wells and Irene Serna identified four strategies that elite parents used to undermine this
reform .27 First, elite parents threatened to withdraw their students from the "detracked"
school if their children were not given the specialized curricula they demanded. Second,
elite parents co-opted institutional elites by directly influencing school administrators,
pressing their case until they gained advocates from within the school to create
specialized placements for their students. Third, high status parents recruited the "not
quite elites" to press their case for them. Parents of students in Advanced Placement
classes convinced the parents of students in the next highest track to lobby for a return to
tracking. The authors point, in particular, to school site-based decision-making teams
that end up pushing for programs such as Advanced Placement, honors programs, and
other programs that select on the basis of academic ability. In response, schools offered
bribes to elite parents to keep their children in a de-tracked school or a magnet school.
For example, a school might promise small classes or the best teachers to elite parents to
convince them not to withdraw their children and send them to another school that
offered high, homogeneous, and selective tracks (Wells and Serna, 1996). Graue and
Smith believe that such strategies to restore the hierarchically arranged classes and
schools have the effect of increasing stratification among schools and diminishing the
quality of educational opportunities for the poor (Graue and Smith, 1996).
In their case study of choice programs in four large urban systems, Donald Moore
and Susan Davenport found that students, after the introduction of magnet schools,
seemed to have a broader array of schools and programs from which to choose. But
many of these options were open only to select groups of students. Choice schools were
less than fair in their admission practices. Students at risk were much less likely to apply
to or be selected by the schools that advertised themselves as advanced academically.
Most working class and poor parents did not comprehend the application process to
select schools. They were less likely to catch on to what elite parents knew: that if the
schools were pushed hard enough they might well admit students who fell below the
required admission standards. Junior high school counselors, even when they were
available, tended to direct low-income students into less selective high schools.
Programs such as the International Baccalaureate selectively advertised to students with
only the top academic records and scores. Academic schools systematically excluded
special education students and students whose first language was not English. The high
track, academically selective schools also attracted the best teachers and the most
resources from the district. Even when admitted to an academically selective school,
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students who failed to conform to its profile found themselves forced out. Finally,
districts pressured school administrators to raise and maintain high test scores lest elite
parents remove their high scoring children.28 All of these practices further segregated
children of color and poverty in the least desirable schools or tracks or
schools-within-schools and thereby consigned them to the fewest educational
opportunities (Moore and Davenport, 1990).29
Hugh Lauder and David Hughes conducted research in New Zealand where school
choice policies have had more influence than they have in the United States (Lauder and
Hughes, 1999). Their research was conducted in an urban setting where transportation to
schools outside students' neighborhood did not prevent choice of schools, as it often
does in American settings. Their research tested hypotheses gleaned from both critics
and advocates of school choice by statistically examining the relationships among social
class and ethnicity of students, the level of academics in four high schools, and academic
achievement (both of students prior to admission and to the schools' effect on
subsequent achievement). They found that most lower class students in high academic
schools were there not because of successful application, but because they lived in the
schools' catchment area. Of the students who applied to the high status academic
schools, there was a strong relationship between their successful admission and their
social class. Furthermore, the following conditions exacerbated stratification of the
schools:
Students from high SES background have the greatest opportunity to avoid
working class schools, and most take it.... students with the highest SES
background in a neighbourhood [sic] are most likely to exercise choice.....
exit from working class schools induces a spiral of decline,30... whereas
schools with more applicants than spaces "effectively insulate themselves
from the effects of the market (Lauder and Hughes, 1999), 101.
The authors argue that stratified opportunities result in disparities in subsequent
achievement, and that such effects accumulate over multiple years of disparate
opportunities.
Despite the remarkable consistency of findings among the studies of the effects of
school choice, we do not have to look beyond Boulder to get a reading on the effects of
the choice movement there. In 1999 the board of education finally decided to
commission an independent analysis of the ramifications of its decisions about school
choice. As a result of that analysis, Ken Howe and Margaret Eisenhart concluded that
the district's policy had resulted in 16 choice schools attended by 20 percent of the
district students. But families that availed themselves of choice options were not
representative of the district as a whole.
This deserves the name 'skimming' because some schools are drawing a
disproportionate number of students from the high scoring pool... whereas
other schools are losing a disproportionate number (Howe and Eisenhart,
2000, p. 10).
Their study also showed that, "Race/ethnicity is a prominent feature of open
enrollment patterns.... students are leaving regions with higher percentages of minorities.
Whites are disproportionately requesting open enrollment in schools with high test
scores" (Howe and Eisenhart, 2000). Boulder schools have become substantially more
stratified by ethnicity since the district adopted school choice policies.
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Howe and Eisenhart concluded that the process by which choice schools recruit
families contributes directly to the increased stratification. For example, applications
that are contingent on donations, requirements that parents volunteer a certain number of
hours, and transportation costs all discriminate against families with low incomes and
constrained schedules. They took to task priority pools, stating that giving priorities to
founders' children and others produce unfairness.
Howe and Eisenhart also pointed out that, because of the district's system of
funding schools, when advantaged families leave their neighborhood school for a charter
or focus school, district funds follow. This drains the budgets of the neighborhood
schools, thus exacerbating the disparities in resources. Those schools then enter a
downward spiral for those who are left behind. They suggested several remedies for the
vast disparities that exit in private funds parents donate to schools of choice in contrast
to neighborhood schools, particularly in less advantaged neighborhoods.
Although surveys showed that parents of both neighborhood schools and schools of
choice were satisfied with their schools, the majority of respondents also believed choice
had negatively affected both the sense of local community and the collegiality of the
professionals. Finally, the authors recommended that the district oversee the application
process, particularly of the lottery, to increase fairness (Howe and Eisenhart, 2000).
But in Boulder, the decisions were already made. All five neighborhood schools in
the city that were closed because of low enrollment have since been converted to schools
of choice.

School Choice and the Illusion of Democracy
Horace Mann envisioned a system of schools financed by state taxes and available
to all, indeed, providing equal education to all. He believed that providing equal
education for all children, irrespective of family origin and wealth promotes the common
good. Democratic participation by citizens in the goals and operations of schools would
direct schools toward fair (or at least majoritarian) ends. Mann's vision was realized, in
part, even though the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights made no mention of public
schools. That the system was constructed at all, let alone that it has endured, must be
testament to deeply held sentiments about educational rights and the public good.
To neoliberals, democracy is not something like the cultural vision of citizens
gathered around the pot-bellied stove at the general store, debating and voting on the
ways to run schools. Instead, neoliberals define democratic participation as individuals
exercising their rights to make choices in a free market of schools. The public good they
define as the aggregate of individual choices of schools. The school choice movement
means to take the public out of public schools.
In spite of Mann's ideals, almost from the beginning of American public schools,
parents sought to abandon them. Elite families avoided the public schools in favor of
selective private schools for their children. For their own children, they did not want
what was available to all. Irish immigrants withheld their children from public schools
because of their profound Protestant bias. White southerners pressed the state to provide
schools for their children that would exclude former slaves. When the Supreme Court
struck down that possibility, they sent their children to private academies for whites
only.
Contrary to what neoliberals and the rest of the choice advocates say, therefore,
public schools have never been monopolies, let alone socialist schools or government
schools, or whatever incendiary labels they might deploy. School choice was ever
available, at least to some families.
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Families with sufficient financial resources could always separate their children
from the common school. Anyon's history of Newark public schools followed its
centripetal course from commons and commoners.31 Industrial leaders moved their
families from the core to the periphery of the city, later from the periphery to the
suburbs. The fathers commuted by trolley, later by car, from their homes to their
factories, passing within sight of the increasingly congested and poor neighborhoods.
Wives and children of the industrialists lost visual access to the neighborhoods and
schools they had left behind. Later still, the industrialists moved the factories themselves
away from the city. They lost, therefore, even the chance to see the conditions they left
behind.
This trajectory created the relationship between neighborhood and school, between
class, labor, and education. The cultural and political capital of the industrial elite
solidified the relationship by vesting school finance at the local level. The economically
poor would become educationally poorer over time. A two-tiered system was in the
making.
As the wealthiest families abandoned the poor and working class families to the
schools in the core cities, they took with them not only their financial advantages to pour
into their own schools. They also invented justification for separation and relative
deprivation. They were able to tolerate school conditions for the poor that they would
never have tolerated for their own children. They invented the ideology of the
neighborhood school. Later they used that image to justify a system highly differentiated
by class and race and to resist judicial efforts to desegregate. Still later they used the
image of neighborhood schools to persuade Federal courts to lift long-standing
desegregation orders (claiming that the virtues of neighborhood schools for their own
children outweighed the virtues of desegregated schools for minority children).
So school choice has always been. What is new about school choice is the political
pressure by elite parents on the State to subsidize—from the public treasury—the
abandonment of the common school. Just the contrary of Horace Mann's ideals.
Demands for charter schools and private school vouchers count merely as an extension
of the more-than-a-century-long desertion of advantaged families from public schools
and the common good.
In Colorado, choice policy provided political opportunities. In Boulder, elite
parents took advantage of those opportunities to exert disproportionate power over the
distribution of values. They professed pubic interests in public while pursuing private
interests in private. They silenced opposition, practiced the discourse of derision, made a
mockery of democratic deliberation. They conducted business in private and capitalized
on connections and media savvy. They thoroughly cowed the district officials (who
ought to have taken responsibility for re-balancing cultural and financial capital) to get
what they wanted for their children—for only their own children. And so they did:
special tracks, programs, trips, opportunities, smaller and more exclusive classes and
schools. Parents won the right to control the schools, select the teachers and curriculum,
select students like their own while excluding others.
Absent political spectacle, could choice policies have transformed public schools so
thoroughly in Boulder, in Arizona or New Zealand? Political spectacle diminishes
democracy. Weakened democracy nourishes political spectacle. In the political
spectacle, even the words "choice," or the word, "market," fog the mind. Most people eat
the thin gruel of words while the few operate backstage to obtain more tangible items for
themselves.
No matter how much political conservatives dress up demands for school choice in
the language of equity and liberty and free market, the sad truth is that not every parent
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will make choices, or will make informed choices, or will make choices that further the
common good or that the best educational choices will be available to all or even
available at all. Further, compelling research suggests that the fate of American schools
in the hands of people with the most cultural and political capital is one of even greater
separation, segregation, and differential opportunities than exists now (Lauder and
Hughes, 1999; Cobb and Glass, 2000; Moore and Davenport, 1990; Wells and Serna,
1996; Wilson, 2000).
And what might that bring? A post-Fordist analysis would suggest that schools and
programs will proliferate, but what is available to some will not be available to all.
Schools and types of students will be increasingly segregated and separated. There is
every reason to predict, therefore, that wealth and cultural capital will diverge even
more. Free markets create winners and losers. Devolution of responsibility will benefit
only the schools for the socially advantaged. The State will retain ultimate authority for
system goals and means of accountability and will exercise these means to punish and
further isolate schools for children of poverty and color. And it all will happen off-stage.

Notes
1

The material in this report is a version of chapter three in Political Spectacle and the
Fate of American Schools (Smith, M.L. with Miller-Kahn, L., Fey, Patricia, Heinecke,
W. & Noble, A.),. The book will be published in 2002 by Routledge/Falmer Press in
Michael Apple's series in critical perspectives in education. The authors appreciate the
cooperation among editors and publishers to be able to include this research in the
Archives.
2

On the Public Broadcasting Network broadcast of The History of American Schools
(September 4, 2001), former Reagan Department of Education official Chester Finn
made this argument—that schools are the only things that Americans cannot change.
The producers failed to ask him about the place of libraries, fire and police departments,
prisons, public hospitals, highways, trash removal, and a long list of other public
institutions that occupy the same relationship between individual and state. Such is the
role of language in the political spectacle—it fogs the mind to the point that audiences
fail to question it.

3

Other parts of the coalition invoked these parents of color whenever they needed to
counter the claims of critics that school choice favored the already advantaged parts of
society.
4

Recall an incident that occurred during the 2000 post election campaign, in which one
candidate held a press conference. Behind the podium with the official seal were two
American flags. Later, a candidate from the other party gave a press conference with five
American flags backing him. Still later a candidate appeared before a huge array of flags.
This time, the candidates went too far, and their posing provided fodder for comedians.
The transporting of disputed ballots from Miami to Tallahassee provided another
opportunity for dramatic staging. Television cameras in helicopters focused on the trucks
the entire length of the trip. Media over reports the dramatic and the visual.
5Edelman refers to democratic participation and rationality as myths. We prefer the
possibility of both, but recognize that in the political spectacle, they are apt to be absent.
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Therefore we refer to them as illusions.
6

The movement of both national parties to the political center may then result from both
listening to the same polls.

7

Herbst, S. (1993). Numbered voices: How public opinion polling has shaped American
politics. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, p. 50.

8

Herbst, p. 156

9

The arguments above do not discount entirely the place of research in policy. Far from
it. Properly interpreted, research studies can contribute to policy arguments. Moreover,
for politicians and policy makers to ignore the research literature may also constitute
irrationality. George W. Bush, when he was governor of Texas, aimed his education
policies at ending "social promotion." He sought to replace the movement of students
from grade to grade based on age with a procedure based on test results. Those who
failed the test failed the grade. Anyone that advocates a policy such as this must
deliberately ignore a body of contrary research that consistently shows the
ineffectiveness of grade repetition. Not only do repeaters make little progress they are
also much more likely to drop out of school instead of graduating. Bush also had to
overlook the inconvenient fact that even before his policy Texas schools practiced little
social promotion. Grade retention rates were high in comparison with other states.

10

A reference to the Lawrence Schiller (1999) book Perfect Murder in a Perfect Town
about the Jon Benet Ramsey case in Boulder about the same time as these data were
collected.

11

In this article, we use the names of public figures. Any other characters have been
given pseudonyms.

12

At the time the parent corporation of the Camera was Knight Ridder. Note that
examples and tallies are available in Miller-Kahn, 2000.

13

State statute and district policy also must conform to Federal law, specifically the
Improving America's Schools Act of 1994. Part C—Public Charter Schools, allows for
federal grant money allocated to states for Charter schools. The exact language follows:
"In General—The Secretary may award grants to State educational agencies having
applications approved pursuant to section 10303 to enable such agencies to conduct a
charter school program in accordance with this part."

14

These disputed images of focus schools vis-a-vis charter schools echoed the disparate
images of charter schools vis-a-vis vouchers. Choice advocates see charters as entrees to
the preferable alternative of vouchers where as public school advocates see charters as
ways to preempt vouchers. Parents could use the Charter School Act as a "threat" to
force the district to create magnet schools. Districts propose the lesser evil from their
point of view to cool out or dampen the determination of parent advocates of choice.

15

One year later Stonegate was approved as a focus school in its own right. Active
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parents at the school believed that the designation protected them from advances from
other focus school proposals and a school board sympathetic to school choice.
16

Swize and the Adams principal (also a close friend of Swize) met with Apex's
founders to discuss the eventual situating of Apex at Adams but parents and teachers
were never informed of the meetings.

17

See, for example, (Bourdieu, 1977).

18

Hult proposed deleting Marine's resignation speech from the board minutes but that
motion failed.

19

At the Montessori Focus School, priority listed students also took most of the
available slots. The founders of Zenith, the K-12 charter school, adopted similar
guidelines but defined as "founder" anyone who paid a fee to get on the list of
applicants. That way, any family on the list would be exempt from the lottery and there
would be fewer slots determined by lot.

20

Apex teachers threatened to walk out on two occasions because parents interfered with
professional decisions. The district knew of the problems and once again paid for a
trained mediator to help teachers and parents work out their problems. The mediator
found that the teachers' concerns were real and suggested that the governance structure
be revamped to include more faculty representation on the Lead Team.

21

A further investigation of the Core Knowledge Foundation website listed its own
research to support the claim that Core Knowledge curriculum was superior to the
curriculum of most school districts. The website did refer to a recent, independent,
longitudinal study on Core Knowledge conducted by John Hopkins University. The
study was funded by the Walton Foundation, a group that has issued grants to Core
Knowledge schools across the country for several years. In an abstract written by a Core
Knowledge employee, the researchers claimed that in schools where Core Knowledge
was consistently implemented the results were promising. They did, however, state that
the positive results were not necessarily due to the Core Knowledge curriculum, but
more likely the result of a consistently applied program (Marshall, 1999).

22

Nine months after the CU report on open enrollment that recommended that the
district handle all choiceapplications to insure an equitable process the Zenith web site
still instructed parents to send two applications directly to the school. One application
was for school purposes and the other would be turned into the district for oversight.

23

Fund raising was another problematic area according to the CU report.

24

The National Issues Forum format, selected by the CASB facilitators for the
deliberative process, was not designed to create recommendations, especially the kind
that Resolution 98-18 required. This may have been a plus for board members who felt
that their decision-making abilities might be threatened by the group's outcome.

25

Intentions of policy makers frequently get transformed through the various layers of
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implementation. See (Hall, 1995).
26

Anyon, J. (1997). Ghetto Schooling : A Political Economy of School Reform. New
York, Teachers College Press.

27

This study focused on de-tracking within schools. Only two of their ten cases were
magnet schools per se. Nevertheless, their findings are relevant here, because schools of
choice in a position to select their students will select the students that best fit their
profiles, whether arts magnets or accelerated academic achievement magnets. Selecting
within a school building for homogeneous groups of successful students follows the
same principle (Wells and Serna, 1996).

28

(Moore and Davenport, 1990).

29

Both of the studies just described emphasized the negative consequences involved
with the use of achievement tests to select students or to establish accountability. Most
standardized tests are systematically biased by socio-economic status. Therefore, to use
test scores as the basis of admission to special schools or programs is automatically to
produce schools stratified according to social class, and by extension, to race (Moore
and Davenport, 1990)and (Wells and Serna, 1996).
30They decline rather than close, as the market theorists would have predicted, these
schools stay open and work on advertising and public image such as pushing increases in
test scores (Lauder and Hughes, 1999).
31Also see (Anyon, 1997).
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